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This slim volume, officially authored by Italian philosopher
Paola Cavalieri, is actually a discussion among Cavalieri and
four others: Cary Wolfe, Harlan Miller, Matthew Calarco, and
John (J. M.) Coetzee. Cavalieri sets the agenda with a piece in
dialogue form, “The Death of the Animal: A Dialogue on Perfectionism.” As Peter Singer points out in his Foreword, in addition to the issue of perfectionism, the book is concerned with
the respective merits of analytic and continental approaches to
animal ethics, and with whether reasoned argument plays the
central role in ethical matters that many philosophers would
like to believe. The exchanges among the participants are sharp
and provocative.
Cavalieri rejects perfectionism: the idea of a hierarchy in
moral status among sentient individuals based on the degree to
which they possess certain cognitive skills (most commonly:
self-consciousness, rationality, and language). She points out
that although we no longer subscribe to perfectionism when
it comes to human beings (who are all considered to possess
“human rights” by virtue of mere intentionality), we regularly
use it to judge the worth of nonhumans, with the abstraction
“the animal” designating the bottom of the perfectionist hierarchy. Cavalieri also rejects the idea that we can have some credible way of judging the relative harm that death is to different
sorts of individuals, based on their levels of mental complexity.
(Given the widespread intuition that death is a greater harm to
a normal human than to a dog—see Regan’s lifeboat case, for
example—it would have been good to have someone in this
volume at least play devil’s advocate on this one.)
While none of the participants is willing to defend perfectionism, Cavalieri’s opening dialogue does unleash a somewhat
heated exchange on analytic versus continental approaches to
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animal ethics. Marx said, “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.”
Analytic philosophers not only have placed animal ethics on
the intellectual agenda, but also have played a major role in the
founding and on-going development of the modern animal-liberation movement. With respect to nonhuman animals, is continental philosophy only for interpreting the world in various
ways, or can it make a real contribution to changing it? Calarco
thinks it possible to adapt the insights of Emmanuel Levinas
and others to make such a contribution.
Calarco criticizes as “metaphysical” the attempt by Cavalieri and other analytic philosophers to demarcate the moral
community, to decide who’s in and what’s out. Instead, he advocates an “agnostic” ethics of universal consideration, open to
the possibility that “anything might take on a face.” Cavalieri
replies that mere moral considerability is not the issue here;
rather, it is who is entitled to basic equality of treatment. If
nonhuman animals are to be included with humans in the community of equals, then even for an ethics of universal consideration there must be a criterion for access to equality.
The reliance of Cavalieri (and many other animal advocates)
on the concept of rights comes under fire from Wolfe and Calarco. Harlan Miller responds that it doesn’t matter whether we
regard rights as natural or artificial: reflection on our moral attitudes toward members of the human family, combined with
logical consistency, calls for expansion of the moral community, and—here Miller makes a point made more than a century
ago by Henry Salt—if humans have moral rights, then many
animals do too. I would add that evolution has hard-wired us
with moral sensibility; we need not demand insight into some
absolute moral realm to know what is right and wrong for us,
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and how we ought to treat others who are subjects of their own
lives.
The contributions of novelist Coetzee are brief but pointed.
He doubts that reason has played the key role in changing the
attitudes to animals of the book’s participants. Rather, each is
likely to have undergone a conversion experience involving
a Levinas-like recognition of the existential autonomy of the
Other, for which backing was then sought in the writings of
thinkers and philosophers. Miller demurs, saying his conversion was a purely intellectual matter of being convinced by the
arguments of Singer and others.
Philosophers may hope to convince the public by force of argument, but Coetzee reminds us that much of that public values
a life of reason less than a life of passion and appetite (“brawling and guzzling and fucking”). There is a joke that asks: How
many psychiatrists does it take to change a light bulb? Answer:
Only one, but the light bulb has to want to change. It seems to
me that reason can, and often does, play a crucial role in changing a person’s mind about animals—but only if the person is
ready to change. In that case, especially for those more intellectually inclined, reason can flip the switch that makes the light
go on. Despite her work with chimpanzees, for many years Jane
Goodall continued to eat meat; then she read Singer’s Animal
Liberation, the light went on, and she stopped eating meat. The
interesting question is what brings a person to the point where
they are ready to change, brings them to the verge of saying,
“Yes, this is what I should do; this is what I want.” That lengthy
prologue is complex, and one in which reason is typically subordinate to the emotions. The young child who feels horror on
learning where her meat comes from is reasoning, but the driving force is sympathy, without which reason is unlikely to gain
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traction. (In the case of the child, this particular sympathy is
likely soon to be suppressed or diverted, perhaps to resurface
later in life.)
Philosophy has its place in the dialectic of reason and passion. Those interested in animal ethics have reason to read The
Death of the Animal.
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